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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Ohio Supreme Court 5 now has an opportunity to re-examine its
decision in Miller v. Hammond and perhaps take cognizance of the logic of
the dissent, or the tune may indeed have arrived for the legislature to de-
clare the public policy of the state of Ohio on this matter."6
CHARLES PERELMAN
Implied Revocation of Wills by Divorce
FIRMLY IMBEDDED in the English common law is the principle that a
will is revoked by implication when subsequent events produce a radical
change in the circumstances of the testator.- A change in the marital or
parental status of an individual was thought to be of such a profound nature
that it would cause a prior will to be revoked by operation of law. Thus,
the subsequent marriage of a feme sole 2 or the subsequent marriage and
birth of issue for a man3 was held to revoke a prior will on the grounds that
the testator would have revoked it had he the opportunity of doing so dur-
ing his lifetime.
The early English cases made no mention of a divorce subsequent to the
execution of a will as a basis for implied revocation.4  This was probably
due to the rarity of divorce in that period and the disfavor with which it was
looked upon in social and ecclesiastical circles.
Today with the increasing frequency of divorce the legislatures of the
various states have become concerned with this problem. The overall issue
of revocation of wills is governed by statutes which differ from state to
state; however, the provisions concerning the effect of a divorce generally
fall into one of three categories.
First, there are statutes which affirmatively state that a subsequent
divorce revokes the testamentary provisions in favor of the testator's spouse.
This means that when the spouse is sole legatee and devisee the entire will
is revoked, but if other heirs are present the will is valid as to them. Only
nine states5 are included in this group. The explicit language of the
statutes presents few other problems of interpretation.
1 ROLLISON, WILLs 237 (1939)
'Hodsen v. Lloyd, 2 Bro. C.C. 535 (1789)
'Brush v. Wilkens, 4 Johns. Ch. 506 (1820)
'ATKINsON, WILLS 431 (2d ed. 1953)
'E.g., PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 180.7(2) "If the testator is divorced from the bonds of
matrimony after making a will, all provisions in the will in favor of his spouse so
divorced shall be thereby revoked." ALA. CODi ANN. nit. 61 § 9(1) (Supp. 1951);
ARK. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 60-404 (Supp. 1953), GA. CoDE ANN. § 113-408
(1949); IND. STAT. ANN. § 59-610 (1949); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 525.191
(1944); N.C. Code § 31-5.4 (1943)
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The second group is composed of twenty-eight jurisdictions whose stat-
utes make no provision for revocation by divorce and do not affirmatively
preserve the common law doctrine of implied revocation. The statutes of
these states usually prescribe certain methods of revocation, such as burning
or tearing of the will, or the publication of a later one. In construing these
provisions most courts hold that the statutory methods are exdusive and
no type of implied revocation is permitted.8 Usually, in these jurisdictions,
a divorce even when coupled with a property settlement will not revoke a
prior will? A few courts, however, adopt the view that such a statute is
only applicable to intentional revocations and does not prevent revocation
by operation of law.10 Yet -hey seem reluctant to imply a revocation solely
on the grounds of divorce.'
In the last group are twelve states whose statutes affirmatively preserve
the common law doctrine of implied revocation but make no mention of
divorce as such.12 In these jurisdictions.it is usually held that a divorce alone
will not revoke a prior will,'3 but that a divorce coupled with a property
settlement will do so.' 4
'In order to avoid an anesthetizing redundancy the terms "revocation of will" etc.,
will henceforth refer to the revocation of the testamentary provisions in favor of the
testator's spouse.
7E.g., CONN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 6959 (1949) " No will or codicil shall be re-
voked in any other manner except by burning, cancelling, tearing, or obliterating it
by the testator or by some person in his presence, by his direction, or by a later will
or codicil." ARiz. CODE ANN. § 41-103 (1939); CAL. PROB. CODE § 70 (1949);
COLO. STAT. ANN. c 126, §40 (1935); D.C. CODE § 19-103 (1940); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 731.14 (1944); IDAHO CODE ANN. tit 14, § 14-307 (1949); ILL. STAT.
ANN. c. 3, § 197 (1941); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.10 (1949); KY. REv. STAT. §
394.080 (1948); LA. STAT. ANN. art. 1692 (1952); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS
art. 93, § 349 (1951); Miss. CODE ANN. § 658 (1942); Mo. REv. ANN. STAT.
tit. 31, 468.20 (1949); MONT. REv. CODEs ANN. § 91-122 (1947); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 3A:3-3 (1951); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-108 (1941); N.Y. DEc. ESTATE
LAW § 34 (1949); N.D. REv. CODE § 56-0401 (1943); OKLA. STAT ANN. tit.
84, § 101 (1951); ORE. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 18-301 (1940); R.I. GEN. LAws c.
566 § 18 (1938); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-221 (1952); S.D. CODE § 56.0217
(1939); TEx. STAT. art. 8285 (1941); UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-1-19 (1953); VA.
CODE ANN. § 64-59 (1950); W VA. CODE ANN. § 4045 (1949)
'In re Brannon's Estate, 111 Cal. App. 38, 295 Pac. 83 (1931); Sperioni v. Sper-
ioni, 406 IMI. 28, 92 N.E.2d 63 (1950); In re Silberstein's Will, 108 N.Y.S.2d 88
(Surr. 1951); In re Nardo's Will, 268 App. Div. 865, 50 N.Y.S.2d 561 (1944).
'Re Patterson's Estate, 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 Pac. 374 (1923); error dis'm, 266
U.S. 594,45 Sup. Ct. 225 (1925); Ireland v. Terwilliger, 54 So.2d 52, (Fla. 1952);
Robertson v. Jones, 345 Mo. 278 (1940).
"Pascucci v. Alsop, 147 F.2d 880 (D.C. 1945); McGuire v. Luckey, 129 Iowa 559,
105 N.W 1004 (1906).
'In re Brown's Estate, 139 Iowa 376, 117 N.W 260 (1908).
'E.g., NEV. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 9912: "No will in writing shall be revoked un-
less by burmng, tearing, cancelling, or obliterating the same but nothing con-
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The better-reasoned cases involving statutes which preserve the doctrine
of implied revocation but make no mention of divorce hold that the only
motives for which a man would leave property to his wife are (1) his affec-
tion for her and/or (2) his obligation to support her. When there is a
divorce or annulment coupled with an alimony award or a property settle-
ment, it would seem that these motives have vanished, and therefore the
law will presume that the testator intended to revoke his will. This argu-
ment becomes more apparent when either of the parties subsequently re-
marries. 5
Frequently courts in following this reasoning will treat the implied revo-
cation as an irrebuttable presumption and evidence of the testator's contrary
intention will not be allowed unless it amounts to a republication. 16
Where the presumption is not conclusive, the elapsed time between the
divorce and the death of the testator has been taken into account by some
courts. A long period of tune is evidence negating the intention of the
testator to revoke his will, while a short period of time is not." However,
this point is a makeweight factor and of itself seldom controlling.
Where the will was made prior to but not expressly contingent upon a
marriage between the testator and a named beneficiary under the will, a
later divorce and property settlement between the two does not invalidate
the bequest. Since many other factors unrelated to the marriage could have
motivated the gift, an implied revocation is unwarranted.'"
If the will grants to the spouse on condition that she still be the testator's
spouse at the time of his death, a subsequent divorce revokes the will regard-
less of the statutory provisions involved.' But where the will states "to my
tamed in this section shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent
changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 109 (1953); ME. REv. STAT. c. 155, § 3 (1944); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 191,
§ 9 (1932); MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (1949); N.H. REv. LAws c. 350, § 14
(1942); OHIO REV. CODE § 2107.33 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 10504-47); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8097 (Williams 1934); VT. REv. STAT. § 2829 (1947); Wis. STAT.
§ 238.14 (1951); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN § 6-306 (1945)
"Chariton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298 (1875); Baacke v. Baacke, 50 Neb. 18, 69
N.W 699 (1896).
'Lansing v. Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N.W 699 (1853); Younker v. Johnson, 160
Ohio St. 409, 116 N.E.2d 715 (1954); In re Barns, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W 9
(1910); Johnston v. Laird, 48 Wyo. 532, 52 P.2d 1219 (1935)
i5in re Gilmour s Estate, 146 Misc. 113, 260 N.Y. Supp. 761 (Surr. 1932).
"In re McGraw s Estate, 233 Mich. 440, 207 N.W 10 (1926); In re Kort's Estate,
260 Wis. 621, 51 N.W.2d 501 (1952); In re Bartis, 143 Wis. 234, 126 N.W 9
(1910)
'Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492 (1881) (five year interval); Murphy v. Markis,
98 N.J. Eq., 153 At. 840 (1925), af'd 99 N.J. Eq. 888, 132 Ad. 923 (1925)
(seven year interval) In both cases the long period of time was considered as evi-
dence that the deceased did not intend to change his will.
"Codner v. Caldwell, 156 Ohio St. 197, 116 N.E.2d 594 (1951)
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husband" or "to my wife" followed by that person's proper name, a subse-
quent divorce does not cut off the gift.20 Courts are prone to construe this
language as descriptive rather than conditional.
OHIO
The common law doctrine of implied revocation of wills has been
preserved in Ohio by statute.21 In accordance with other states which have
similar statutes, the Ohio courts have held that a subsequent divorce of
itself does not impliedly revoke a will,22 but that a divorce coupled with a
property settlement will do So.2 3
Although the precise question has not arisen in this jurisdiction, the
authorities cited in Ohio cases would seem to indicate that the revocation
is treated as an irrebuttable presumption.24  In at least one instance the
court has taken note of the long period of elapsed tune between the divorce
and death of the testator as evidence negating any intention to change his
will.2 5 0
Where the will is made prior to the marriage of the testator and a bene-
ficiary under the will but not contingent upon it, a subsequent divorce and
property settlement does not revoke the will.2 6 But if under similar cir-
cumstance the will is contingent upon the ensuing marriage, a later divorce
does invalidate It.27
CONCLUSION
It is interesting to note that of the nine statutes which expressly provide
that a subsequent divorce revokes a will, six have been enacted since 1947 28
This is largely due to the influence of the Model Probate Code, which holds
that a divorce is the only grounds on which a will may be impliedly re-
voked -.2  Undoubtedly, more statutes of this type will appear in the future.
RICHARD J. CusIc JR.
"Goorman v. McMfillan, 258 Ala. 125, 61 So.2d 55 (1952), ceri. denied, 345 U.S.
929, 73 Sup. Ct. 789 (1953), rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 1004, 73 Sup. Ct. 942
(1953); Iles v. lies, 158 Fla. 493, 29 So.2d 81 (1947).
'In re Cournoiser's Will, 55 N.Y.S.2d 277 (Surf. 1944); Charlton v. Miller, 27
Ohio St. 298 (1875); In re Jones Estate, 211 Pa. 364, 60 Ad. 915 (1905)21 iOmo REv. CODE § 2107.33 (OHIo GEN. CODE § 10504-47).
22 Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298 (1875).
'Younkers v. Johnson, 160 Ohio St. 409, 116 N.E.2d 715 (1954) Contra: Sut-
ton v. Bethell, 116 N.E.2d 594 (Ohio App. 1953).
'Younkers v. Johnson, 160 Ohio St 409, 116 N.E.2d 715 (1954) Contra: Sut-
' Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio Sr. 298 (1875) (five year interval)
' Codner v. Caldwell, 156 Ohio St. 197, 116 N.E.2d 594 (1951).
'Charlton v. Miller, 27 Ohio St. 298 (1875).
'Ala. (1951); Ark. (1949); Ga. (1952); Ind. (1953); N.C. (1953); Pa. (1947)
"MODEL PROBATE CODE § 53.
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